📰7.9.4 Potential network threats

The structure of the Winc network anticipates that some bad actors, given the opportunity, might attempt to feed bad sporting events outcome data to the network. Consequences for bad actors: See 7.9.2 Penalized nodes. The Oracle Masternode network requires multiple checks on contracts to safeguard against false winners. The rigid language of the smart contract structure leaves no vulnerable surface for attack. Supermajority (75% ) vs. simple majority (51%) Oracle Masternode operators have a deeply vested interest in the security and integrity of the blockchain, event results, core protocols, and coin code. Events require 75% network consensus, ensuring that the posted data is highly reliable. Consider this 75% requirement in contrast with almost all digital currencies which require a simple majority (over 50%) to be considered “consensus.” Winc governance and security protocols are far more secure. Major protocol changes require two thirds (66.67%) consensus among Oracle Masternodes. The ability to acquire this much of the network would be either cost prohibitive, or logistically impossible due to the anonymity of the system. Furthermore, even if attackers attained 66.67% of the network, they would have the most to lose by attempting to manipulate the network in their favor. If they were to change the rules to produce unfair outcomes, their bad actions would drive the value of the Winc network and WİNC token to zero. The more any Winc network participant owns, the more incentive they have to enhance network value — and the more disincentive they have to harm the network. Again, the transparency of open source code means that any hostile change would be flagged. The sustained buying pressure necessary to achieve disproportionate network control would drive up the price of WINC, requiring a huge investment, such than any attempt to abuse the system would result in catastrophic losses for the bad actor. Winc eliminates the possibility of low cost network attacks by charging higher fees for activities that consume resources, but detract, rather than add, value to the network. For instance: ● The network restricts high volume/small value bets by requiring minimum bet amounts. ● The network also imposes increased fees for small value bets